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Abstract
We study a very small three player poker game (one-third street Kuhn poker),
and a simplified version of the game that is interesting because it has three distinct
equilibrium solutions. For one-third street Kuhn poker, we are able to find all of the
equilibrium solutions analytically. For large enough pot size, P , there is a degree of
freedom in the solution that allows one player to transfer profit between the other
two players without changing their own profit. This has potentially interesting
consequences in repeated play of the game. We also show that in a simplified
version of the game with P > 5, there is one equilibrium solution if 5 < P ≤ P ∗ ≡
(5 +
√
73)/2, and three distinct equilibrium solutions if P > P ∗. This may be the
simplest non-trivial multiplayer poker game with more than one distinct equilibrium
solution and provides us with a test case for theories of dynamic strategy adjustment
over multiple realisations of the game.
We then study a third order system of ordinary differential equations that models
the dynamics of three players who try to maximise their expectation by continuously
varying their betting frequencies. We find that the dynamics of this system are os-
cillatory, with two distinct types of solution. Finally, we study a difference equation
model, based on repeated play of the game, in which each player continually updates
their estimates of the other players’ betting frequencies. We find that the dynam-
ics are noisy, but basically oscillatory for short enough estimation periods and slow
enough frequency adjustments, but that the dynamics can be very different for other
parameter values.
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1 Introduction
Poker is a multiplayer game of imperfect information. Although popular variants of
poker, such as Texas Holdem and Omaha, are large, complex well-defined test problems
for researchers in artificial intelligence [4], their size and complexity masks the fact that
even small and simple toy poker games pose significant theoretical challenges. Most of
the literature on poker, simplified or otherwise, focusses on solving the game, in the
sense of finding Nash equilibrium solutions. Two player poker is a zero sum game, so
all equilibrium solutions have the same expectation for each player, [11]. Recently, two
player Limit Holdem, a large and complex game, was numerically solved in this sense [5],
and a recently-developed, sophisticated AI that combines neural networks with on the fly
equilibrium computation plays the even larger game of two player No Limit Holdem close
to optimally [7]. However, even a simple two player, zero sum game leads to significant
theoretical challenges when studied as a repeated game (for example, two player Kuhn
poker, also known as the AKQ game, [9]).
Full street, three player Kuhn poker with pot size three units was introduced in [8]
in order to test the performance of the counterfactual regret algorithm in three player
games, a context in which convergence to an equilibrium solution is not guaranteed.
Later, a family of equilibrium solutions was found analytically, [10], although it was not
established whether other equilibrium solutions exist. This game was subsequently pro-
posed as part of the 2015 Annual Computer Poker Competition to test the performance
of AI players [1]. An indicator of the jump in dynamic complexity from two player to
three player zero sum games is the fact that a repeated game for only three players
with a deck of just four cards is a difficult, unsolved problem that attracts significant
attention from the AI community.
In this paper we study the one-third street version of three player Kuhn poker. Full
and half street two player games are discussed extensively by Chen and Ankenman in
[6]. Following their definitions, in the full street game Players 1, 2 and 3 can all be
the first to bet, whilst in the one-third street game, Players 1 and 2 must check, and
Player 3 makes the first decision (check or bet). It is this simpler game that we study
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here, but with the size of the initial pot, P units, arbitrary. The natural choice, P = 3,
(each player contributes one unit to the pot before play starts) has been used in previous
work, [8], [10]. In Section 2 (details in Appendix A), we determine all of the equilibrium
solutions of three player, one-third street Kuhn poker. The equilibrium is unique and
trivial for P ≤ 2. For P > 2, there is no unique equilibrium solution, but the nature of
this non-uniqueness varies with P . When P = 5 or P ≥ P ∗ ≡ 12
(
5 +
√
73
) ≈ 6.77, there
is a degree of freedom in the solution that allows one player to transfer profit between
the other two players without changing their own profit. This has potentially interesting
consequences in repeated play of the game. For all other values of P > 2, Player 3 bluffs
with J and/or Q at equilibrium with a well-defined total bluffing frequency.
Our analysis of this game suggests that it is also of interest to study a simplified
variant (Player 3 must check with K and Q, Player 2 must call a single bet with K,
P ≥ 5), which forms the subject of the rest of this paper. In Section 3, we show (details
in Appendix B) that this simplified game has one equilibrium solution when 5 < P ≤ P ∗,
and three distinct equilibrium solutions when P > P ∗. Moreover, for P > 7 it is not clear
which, if any, of these equilibria would be prefered in a game between rational players.
One of our main aims in this paper is to introduce this simplified three player variant as
perhaps the most straightforward nontrivial multiplayer poker game with more than one
distinct equilibrium solution. It contains just three strategic decisions, characterized by
three betting frequencies, one for each player. This suggests several ways in which the
repeated game can be modelled. In section 4.1, we study a third order system of ordinary
differential equations that models the dynamics of three players who try to maximise
their expectation by continuously varying their betting frequencies. We find that the
dynamics of this sytem are oscillatory, with two distinct types of solution. In section 4.2,
we study a difference equation model, based on repeated play of the game, in which each
player continually updates their estimates of the other players’ betting frequencies. We
find that the dynamics are noisy, but basically oscillatory for short enough estimation
periods and slow enough frequency adjustments, but that the dynamics can be very
different for other parameter values.
2 One-third street, three player, Kuhn poker
The deck contains four cards, A > K > Q > J, and each player is dealt a single card
at random. There is a pot of P units. Players 1 and 2 are forced to check. Player 3
can then either check, in which case there is a showdown, or bet one unit. If Player 3
bets, Player 1 must either call or fold. Player 2 must then either call (overcall if Player
1 has called) or fold. If Player 1 and/or Player 2 calls, there is a showdown at which the
player with the best card wins the pot and all the bets, otherwise Player 3 wins the pot.
This is the one-third street version of three player Kuhn poker, which was introduced in
[8]. Figure 1 shows the decision tree1.
1Note that this is not the full game tree as it does not show the hidden cards (information sets) or
the payoffs at the terminal nodes.
3
3Check
1
2
Fold Call, (0, dQ, dK , 1)
Fold
2
Fold Call, (0, 0, oK , 1)
Call, (0, cQ, cK , 1)
Bet, (bJ , bQ, 0, 1)
Figure 1: The decision tree for three player, one-third street Kuhn poker. Open circles
are decision nodes (labelled by the player making the decision), whilst solid circles are
terminal nodes. Betting and calling frequencies with (J,Q,K,A) are also shown.
Although each player is free to make either of their available decisions with any card,
assuming rational players:
1. Player 3 will bet with A, and Players 1 and 2 will call or overcall with A (A always
wins at showdown).
2. Players 1 and 2 will always fold J when Player 3 bets (J always loses at showdown).
3. Player 2 will not overcall with Q after a call from Player 1 (Q cannot be the best
card).
4. Player 3 will not bet with K (Either Player 1 or Player 2 will hold A two-thirds
of the time, call and win, which leads to a loss that outweighs any profit Player 3
may make from Player 1 or 2 calling with Q).
As an aside, note that point 4. above assumes a level of rationality that exceeds that of
many recreational poker players. Betting in situations in which no worse hand will call
and no better hand will fold is endemic amongst weak human players, [3].
The strategy parameters that we need to consider are:
Player 3: Bluffing frequencies bJ and bQ with J and Q.
Player 1: Calling frequencies cQ and cK with Q and K.
Player 2a: Calling frequencies dQ and dK with Q and K after Player 2 folds.
Player 2b: Overcalling frequency oK with K after Player 2 calls.
When P < 2, bJ = bQ = cQ = cK = dQ = dK = 0, with oK undetermined, is
the unique, trivial equilibrium solution. Unless the pot is large enough, Player 3 has
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no incentive to bluff, and Players 1 and 2 therefore have no incentive to call. We will
now assume that P ≥ 2. We show in Appendix A, and confirm by symbolic algebra in
Appendix C.2, that the equilibrium solutions are
0 ≤ bJ + bQ ≤ 2
3
, cQ = cK = dQ = dK = oK = 0 for P = 2, (1)
bJ + bQ =
2
P + 1
, cQ = cK = 0, dQ = 0, dK =
2P − 4
P + 1
, oK = 0 (2)
for 2 < P < 5,
1
3
≤ bJ + bQ ≤ 2
5
, cQ = cK = 0, dQ = 0, dK = 1, oK = 0 (3)
for P = 5,
bJ + bQ =
2
P
, bQ >
12 + 5P − P 2
6P (P + 1)
, cQ = 0, cK =
P − 5
P + 1
, dQ = 0, dK = 1, oK = 0
(4)
for 5 < P < P ∗ ≡ 12(5 +
√
73) ≈ 6.67,
bJ + bQ =
2
P
, cQ = 0, cK =
P − 5
P + 1
, dQ = 0, dK = 1, oK = 0 (5)
for P ≥ P ∗, (Solution A)
bJ =
2
P
, bQ = 0, 0 ≤ cQ ≤ 2
P + 4
, cK =
P − 5
P + 1
, dQ = 0, dK = 1, oK = 0 (6)
for P ≥ P ∗. (Solution B)
Note that Player 2 neither calls with Q nor overcalls with K at equilibrium (dQ = 0 and
oK = 0), which is not obvious a priori. Note also that P
∗ ≡ 12
(
5 +
√
73
)
is the only
positive root of 12+5P −P 2 = 0, so the constraint on bQ in (4) is satisfied by all positive
bQ when P ≥ P ∗.
At the bifurcation points P = 2 and P = 5, a range of total bluffing frequencies,
bJ + bQ is possible for Player 3. Away from these two points, there is a fixed bluffing
frequency for Player 3. However, with the exception of Solution B, the choice of J or
Q as a bluffing card for Player 3 is not constrained; only bJ + bQ is prescribed. This
indeterminacy arises because Players 1 and 2 never call with Q at equilibrium. In
Solution B, which only exists for P > P ∗ ≡ 12(5 +
√
73) ≈ 6.77, Player 1 can call with
Q with a frequency up to 2/(P + 4) without affecting her expectation, and Players 2
or 3 cannot exploit her, neither by overcalling with K (Player 2) nor by bluffing more
with J (Player 3), provided that Player 3 bluffs only with J (bJ = 2/P , bQ = 0). The
equilibrium frequencies are plotted in Figure 2. For 2 < P < 5, Player 2 uses K to catch
Player 3’s bluffs. For P > 5, Player 2 cannot call often enough with K, and Player 1
must call with K at frequency (P − 5)/(P + 1), which allows Player 3 to bluff slightly
more often.
The ex-showdown expectations of these solutions are
E1 = E2 = E3 = 0 for P ≤ 2, (7)
5
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
P
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
bJ+bQ
cK
dK
Figure 2: The equilibrium bluffing and calling frequencies for one-third street, three
player Kuhn poker.
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E1 = − P − 2
12(P + 1)
, E2 = − P − 2
12(P + 1)
, E3 =
P − 2
6(P + 1)
for 2 ≤ P < 5, (8)
E1 = −1
8
(bJ + bQ), E2 = − 1
12
+
1
8
(bJ + bQ), E3 =
1
12
for P = 5, (9)
E1 = −P − 2
12P
, E2 = −(P − 1)(P − 2)
12P (P + 1)
, E3 =
P − 2
6(P + 1)
for P > 5, (Solution A) (10)
E1 = −P − 2
12P
, E2 = −cQ−(P − 1)(P − 2)
12P (P + 1)
, E3 = cQ+
P − 2
6(P + 1)
for P ≥ P ∗, (Solution B)
(11)
and are plotted in Figure 3 with cQ = 0. For all P , Player 3 has the chance to check with
K and thereby realize its potential at showdown (poker players say that Player 3 has
position). In contrast, at equilibrium Players 1 and 2 sometimes fold K when it is the
best card and would win the pot at showdown. This means that Player 3’s ex-showdown
expectation, E3, is positive, whilst those of Players 1 and 2, E1 and E2, are negative.
Note that Player 3’s expectation, E3, is a continuous function of P at equilibrium,
whilst those of the other players, E1 and E2, are discontinuous at P = 5, with Player
1 losing more than Player 2 for P > 5. At P = 5, Player 3 can transfer profit between
Players 1 and 2 at equilibrium by varying her total bluffing frequency (13 ≤ bJ +bQ ≤ 25).
Similarly, when P ≥ P ∗, Player 1 can transfer profit from Player 2 to Player 3 by
choosing 0 ≤ cQ ≤ 2P+4 . Player 3 should therefore choose bJ = 2/P for P ≥ P ∗ in order
to maximise her potential profit. We now discuss some possible implications of this for
repeated play of the game.
2.1 Repeated one-third street Kuhn poker
If P = 5, Player 3 can transfer profit between Players 1 and 2 at equilibrium by appro-
priately choosing her bluffing frequency, bJ + bQ. If P > P
∗, Player 1 can transfer profit
between Players 2 and 3 by changing her calling frequency with Q, cQ. In either case,
in repeated play of the game with rotation, if two of the players form an alliance they
can transfer profit to each other.
As an example, consider the game with P = 5. Player 3 controls the distribution of
profit between Players 1 and 2 at equilibrium. If players 3 and 1 are in an alliance, Player
1 will use cK = cQ = 0, and if Player 3 chooses bJ = 1/3, bQ = 0, the expectations of the
three players are independent of Player 2’s choice of strategy and Player 1’s expectation
is maximised. However, if Players 3 and 2 are in an alliance (perhaps the same two
players after rotation of seats), with Player 2 choosing dQ = 0, dK = 1 and oK = 0 and
Player 3 choosing bJ + bQ = 2/5, the expectations are
E1 =
5
24
cQ
(
bJ − 2
5
)
− 1
20
, E2 = − 5
24
cQ
(
bJ − 1
5
)
− 1
30
+
1
60
cK , E3 =
1
12
− 1
60
cK+
1
24
cQ.
By choosing non-zero values of cQ and/or cK (i.e. calling some fraction of the time
with Q and/or K), Player 1 can transfer profit between Players 2 and 3. Note that by
choosing bJ < 1/5, Player 3 can protect Player 2 from this possibility, but that if she
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
P
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
E1
E2
E3
Figure 3: The ex-showdown expectations for one-third street, three player Kuhn poker
with cQ = 0 (i.e. not solution B).
chooses bJ > 1/5, Player 1 can choose to target either Player 2 by calling with Q (at
some cost to herself) or Player 3 by calling with K (at no cost to herself). Furthermore,
as the players’ positions rotate, the player who is not in the alliance will be Player 3
one-third of the time, which gives her an opportunity to decide how to treat the other
two players.
A further complicating factor is that the strategy parameters are betting and calling
frequencies. The actual game is played with the cards dealt, not with publicly available
values of the parameters, which must be estimated by the players from the information
that they have. Game theory usually assumes rationality in the players, but it is not
clear whether the level of rationality assumed when asserting that a player will not fold
with A is the same as that assumed when asserting that a player will estimate another
player’s frequency of calling with Q when they are Player 1 and exploit any opportunity
for profit that this might present. This is where skill enters the picture and an AI player
should be able to achieve win rates that exceed those of a rational but imperfect human
player, or indeed an inferior AI.
In [10], a similar possibility is discussed for an equilibrium solution of the full street
version of the game. Note that there is numerical evidence from CFR solutions of the
full street game with a range of pot sizes, [2], that P = 3 (the pot size used in [10]) is
a bifurcation point (along with P = 4 and P = 5) in the same way that P = 5 is a
bifurcation point in the one-third street game studied here. It is not clear how much of
the complicated equilibrium solution studied in [10] remains when P 6= 3, and whether
there is any analogue of the continuous range of solutions of this type that exist in the
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one-third street game for P > P ∗.
3 Simplified one-third street, three player, Kuhn poker (SKP)
In this section we consider simplified one-third street three player Kuhn poker (SKP),
in which:
• P > 5,
• Player 3 must check with Q (bQ ≡ 0),
• Player 1 cannot call with Q (cQ ≡ 0),
• Player 2 must call with K (dK ≡ 1).
An immediate consequence of these restrictions is that Player 2 never overcalls with K
when Player 1 calls (since Player 1 must then have A). Note that in the full game, which
we analysed in the previous section, when P > 5 the equilibrium solution has dK = 1
and oK = 0, and also allows cQ = 0. The main simplification we make, which leads to
the existence of multiple, distinct equilibrium solutions, is that Player 3 is not allowed
to bluff with Q (bQ = 0).
The remaining nontrivial decisions are:
Player 3: bluffing frequency with J, bJ ,
Player 1: calling frequency with K, cK ,
Player 2: calling frequency with Q, dQ.
The simplified betting tree is shown in Figure 4.
We demonstrate in Appendix B, and confirm numerically in Appendix C.1, that the
equilibrium solutions are
bJ =
2
P + 1
, cK = 0, dQ =
P − 5
P + 1
, (Solution 1) (12)
bJ =
2
P
, cK =
P − 5
P + 1
, dQ = 0, (Solution 2) (13)
for P ≥ P ∗ = 12(5 +
√
73) ≈ 6.77,
bJ =
2
P
, cK =
2
P + 2
, dQ =
P 2 − 5P − 12
P (P + 1)
, (Solution 3) (14)
for P ≥ P ∗.
In Solution 1, Player 2 calls with Q at a non-zero frequency, whilst Player 1 folds K. In
Solution 2, Player 1 calls with K at the same non-zero frequency, whilst Player 2 folds Q
(this is also a solution in the unsimplified, one-third street game). In Solution 3, Players
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3Check
1
2
Fold Call, (0, dQ, 1, 1)
Fold
2
Fold Call, (0, 0, 0, 1)
Call, (0, 0, cK , 1)
Bet, (bJ , 0, 0, 1)
Figure 4: The decision tree for simplified three player, one-third street Kuhn poker.
Open circles are decision nodes (labelled by the player making the decision), whilst solid
circles are terminal nodes. Betting and calling frequencies with (J,Q,K,A) are also
shown.
1 and 2 call with K and Q respectively at a non-zero frequency. These frequencies are
illustrated in Figure 5.
The ex-showdown expectations,
E1 = − P − 2
12(P + 1)
, E2 = − P − 2
12(P + 1)
, E3 =
P − 2
6(P + 1)
, (Solution 1) (15)
E1 = −P − 2
12P
, E2 = −(P − 1)(P − 2)
12P (P + 1)
, E3 =
P − 2
6(P + 1)
, (Solution 2) (16)
E1 = −P − 2
12P
, E2 = −P
2 − P − 8
12P (P + 2)
, E3 =
2P 2 − P − 12
12P (P + 2)
, (Solution 3) (17)
are illustrated in Figure 6. Note that Player 1 has her greatest expectation in Solution 1
and Player 2 in Solution 2. Player 3 has her greatest expectation in Solution 3 if P > P ∗,
but has the same expectation in each of Solutions 1 and 2 if P ≤ P ∗. However, if each
player is restricted to choosing one of the three possible options (effectively two options
for Player 3), we find that the maxmin strategy (the best worst-case payoff) is:
• Player 1: Solution 1,
• Player 2: Solution 1 for P < 7, Solution 2 for P > 7,
• Player 3: Solution 1.
This was determined by numerical computation. We conclude that for P < 7, Solution
1 is a rational choice for the three players. However, for P > 7, this suggests that
Player 1 has an incentive to choose Solution 1 (cK = 0) and Player 2 to choose Solution
2 (dQ = 0). Although the maxmin strategy for Player 3 under these constraints is
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5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10
P
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Solution 1
bJ
dQ
5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10
P
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Solution 2
bJ
cK
5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10
P
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Solution 3
bJ
cK
dQ
Figure 5: The three equilibrium solutions of simplified, one-third street, three player
Kuhn poker.
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5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10
P
-0.07
-0.06
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
E
1
Solution 1
Solutions 2 and 3
5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10
P
-0.07
-0.06
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
E
2
Solution 1
Solution 2
Solution 3
5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10
P
0.08
0.09
0.1
0.11
0.12
0.13
E
3
Solutions 1 and 2
Solution 3
Figure 6: The expectations of the three equilibrium solutions of simplified, one-third
street, three player Kuhn poker.
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Solution 1, cK = dQ = 0 is not part of an equilibrium solution and leaves Players 1
and 2 open to exploitation by Player 3 by increasing bJ . This strongly suggests that
the outcome of a repeated game between rational players is unlikely to settle at an
equilibrium solution if P > 7, and, depending on the dynamics of the players’ decision
making, this may also be the case for P ≤ 7. In the following section, we will investigate
this further.
4 Dynamic models of repeated, simplified, one-third street Kuhn poker
(SKP)
In SKP, as defined in the previous section, there are three distinct equilibrium solutions.
In order to understand which, if any, of these equilibria might be selected in repeated
play, we will construct and analyse two models. Each is based on the idea that a player
knows their ex-showdown expectation in terms of the three betting frequencies defined
above (bJ , cK and dQ) and adjusts the frequency that they control to try to maximise
this expectation. This is a reasonable assumption about how human players might
approach this game, i.e. bluff more if Players 1 and/or 2 don’t call enough, call more if
Player 3 bluffs too much. In section 4.1, we study a model that treats the three betting
frequencies as continuous functions of time, t, and write down a third order system of
nonlinear ordinary differential equations that controls their evolution and has the same
three equilibrium solutions as SKP. Although this model has a number of weaknesses,
which we discuss, we will see that in some cases its dynamics are very similar to those
of the more realistic model that we study in section 4.2. In particular, none of the
three equilibrium states is an asymptotic attractor of the system. The attractors are
nested periodic solutions, one set oscillating about the equilibrium that corresponds to
Solution 1 and the other about the equilibrium that corresponds to Solution 2, with
the selection of the attractor depending on the initial frequencies. In section 4.2, we
describe a difference equation model that is linked to repeated play of SKP, with each
player storing information about the most recent plays of the game and using it to
estimate the betting frequencies of the other two players.
Note that in each game the players remain in the same seats for each deal of the
cards. In real three player poker games, the participants’ roles rotate after every deal,
so that in effect they are successively playing three separate games in rotation. Human
players make deductions about each others strategies based on their play in similar, but
different, situations. We will not consider this possibility here.
4.1 An ordinary differential equation model of SKP
The signs of the coefficients of cK , dQ and bJ in expressions (38) to (40) respectively,
indicate the direction in which each player should change their betting frequency in
order to increase their expectation. If we now treat the three frequencies as continuous
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functions of time, t, this suggests that a rational model for how they vary is given by
b˙J = g(bJ)f3
(
P − 5
P + 1
− dQ − cK + dQcK
)
, (18)
c˙K = g(cK)f1
(
bJ − 2
P
)
, (19)
d˙Q = g(dQ)f2
(
cK − 2
P + 1
+ bJ(1− cK)
)
, (20)
where a dot denotes d/dt, g is a smooth, non-negative function that vanishes at zero
and one, thereby ensuring that each frequency lies in [0, 1], and fi for i = 1, 2, 3 are
non-decreasing functions of their single arguments. The simplest form of this model,
which we shall study here, has g(x) = x(1− x) and fi(x) = kix, with ki strictly positive
constants. This leads to the system
b˙J = k3bJ(1− bJ)
(
P − 5
P + 1
− dQ − cK + dQcK
)
, (21)
c˙K = k1cK(1− cK)
(
bJ − 2
P
)
, (22)
d˙Q = k2dQ(1− dQ)
(
cK − 2
P + 1
+ bJ(1− cK)
)
. (23)
We can see immediately that the three equilibrium solutions of SKP are also equilibrium
solutions of this system, and also that the six planes bJ = 0, bJ = 1, cK = 0, cK = 1,
dQ = 0 and dQ = 1 are invariant. We are only interested in the dynamics of the system
for each of bJ , cK and dQ in [0, 1], where the solutions remain.
It is worth emphasising here that this is not an evolutionary game; there is no
population whose composition varies with t. The three frequencies are controlled by
three individual players, who adjust them in response to the frequencies of the other two
players, of which they are assumed to have perfect knowledge.
A local analysis close to the three equilibrium points, S1 = (2/(P+1), 0, (P−5)/(P+
1)), S2 = (2/P, (P − 5)/(P + 1), 0) and, for P > P ∗, S3 = (2/P, 2/(P + 2), (P 2 − 5P −
12)/P (P + 1)), which correspond to (12) to (14), shows that
• S1 has a one-dimensional stable manifold and a two dimensional centre manifold.
This centre manifold is the plane cK = 0, and here the dynamics are those of a
nonlinear centre, i.e. a series of nested limit cycles (periodic solutions).
• S2 has a one-dimensional manifold that is stable for P > P ∗ and unstable for
P < P ∗, and a two dimensional centre manifold. This centre manifold is the plane
dQ = 0, and here the dynamics are those of a nonlinear centre, i.e. a series of
nested limit cycles.
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• S3 has a one-dimensional unstable manifold and a two-dimensional stable manifold.
The dynamics on the stable manifold are oscillatory. The stable manifold separates
the two domains of attraction of the planes cK = 0, which contains S1 and dQ = 0,
which contains S2.
Moreover, it is possible to show that this description is also qualitatively correct for
the more general system, (18) to (20). We conclude that, generically, the solution is
attracted to one of the limit cycles that surrounds either S1 or S2. When P < P
∗,
the solution is attracted to a limit cycle surrounding S1
2, but for P > P ∗ the selection
depends on the initial conditions (initial betting frequencies). We will focus on the more
interesting case, P > P ∗.
In the following, all solutions are plotted for the typical case k1 = k2 = k3 = 1, P = 9
and calculated numerically using the solver ode45 in MATLAB. Figure 7 shows the limit
cycles in the plane cK = 0. On each integral path, the solution evolves anticlockwise. As
Player 3 bluffs more frequently, Player 2 calls more frequently, which causes Player 3 to
bluff less frequently, then Player 2 to call less frequently, and so on, ad infinitum. The
solutions in the invariant plane dQ = 0 are very similar and represent the same cycle of
rise and fall in bluffing and calling frequencies, but for Players 1 and 3. By integrating
equations (21) to (23) backwards in time from an initial point in phase space close to
the unstable equilibrium solution S3, we can numerically calculate an integral path that
lies in the the stable manifold of S2, which is shown in Figure 8. This gives us a visual
indication of the boundary of the basins of attraction of the two stable attractors. An
example of each type of solution is shown in Figure 9. Finally, Figure 10 shows the
ex-showdown expectations of each player for the solutions shown in Figure 9, defined by
E1(t) =
1
24
∫ t
0
{cK(s)(PbJ(s)− 2)− (P − 2)bJ(s)} ds, (24)
E2(t) =
1
24
∫ t
0
{dQ(s) {cK(s)− 2 + bJ(s)(1− cK(s))(P + 1)}+ bJ(s)(cK(s) + 3)− 2} ds,
(25)
E3(t) =
1
24
∫ t
0
{bJ(s) [P − 5− (P + 1) {dQ(s) + (1− dQ(s))cK(s)}]
+2cK(s) + (2− cK(s))dQ(s) + 2} ds. (26)
We can see that, for the case shown in Figure 10, these expectations oscillate about
those of the S1 and S2 equilibrium solutions given by (15) and (16).
4.2 A difference equation model with estimators and real game play
In this section, we study a more realistic model of repeated play of SKP. In the ith of N
rounds of play, Players 1, 2 and 3 have frequencies ci, di and bi respectively and stacks
S1i, S2i and S3i, with Sp1 = 0 for p = 1, 2, 3. On each round, each player contributes
2The limit cycles that surround S2 are unstable for P < P
∗, which reflects the fact that S2 is not an
equilibrium solution of SKP.
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Figure 7: Nested limit cycles in the plane cK = 0.
16
Figure 8: An integral path in the stable manifold of S3. This manifold separates the
basins of attraction of the two attracting planes.
17
Figure 9: Two solutions with different final behaviour.
18
Figure 10: The ex-showdown expectations of the solutions shown in Figure 9.
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P/3 units to the pot, and three cards are dealt, but, for computational efficiency, we
exclude combinations where Player 3 is dealt K or Q, since she must check and no
decisions are made. One of the twelve possible combinations in which Player 3 is dealt
A or J is chosen at random on each round. Play then proceeds as described in section 3,
with betting frequencies bi, ci and di, and stacks updated appropriately after each round
of play is complete, when the betting frequencies are also adjusted using a difference
equation analogue of (21) to (23), namely
bi+1 = max
{
0,min
{
1, bi + k3
(
P − 5
P + 1
− d¯i − c¯3i + d¯ic¯3i
)}}
, (27)
ci+1 = max
{
0,min
{
1, ci + k1
(
b¯1i − 2
P
)}}
, (28)
di+1 = max
{
0,min
{
1, di + k2
(
c¯2i − 2
P + 1
+ b¯2i(1− c¯2i)
)}}
. (29)
Here, the barred variables on the right hand side are estimators of the opponents’ betting
frequencies. For example, b¯2i is Player 2’s estimate of Player 3’s bluffing frequency after
i rounds of play. Player p uses the previous Lp hands to construct unbiassed estimators
of the other players’ frequencies based on information available to him. Details of these
estimators are given in Appendix D.
The strategy of each player is characterised by the adjustment rate parameter, kp,
which determines how rapidly they adjust their betting frequency in response to their
estimates of the opponents’ strategies, and Lp, the number of recent rounds of play
that they use to estimate these strategies. Larger values of Lp lead to more accurate
estimates, but a longer delay in the estimates. In this paper, we will focus on the
dynamics when each player uses identical parameters, with Lp = L and kp = k for
p = 1, 2, 3, which allows us to illustrate the dynamic complexity of the game, along
with the difficulty of predicting this based on either equilibrium considerations or even
the differential equation model studied in the previous section.
Figures 11 and 12 show how the frequencies vary for a range of values of k and L
when P = 9, with initial conditions close to S3. When the rate of adaptation, k, is
relatively slow (k = 0.001), the solution lies close to S2. Figure 13 shows the solution
for small and large L. Note that the solution becomes smoother as L increases, and
lies further from S2. When the rate of adaptation is faster (k = 0.01), the solution
lies further from S2 and displays rather larger amplitude oscillations, particularly for
larger values of L. Figure 14 shows the time series for large and small L. The solution
when L = 192 displays a very regular relaxation oscillation, with Player 3 bluffing more,
Players 1 and 2 both calling more in response, Player 3 bluffing less, Players 1 and 2
calling less, and so on. Figure 15 shows that, for P > P ∗ (P = 9 in the Figure), by
changing the initial condition, for k and L sufficiently small, the solution can eventually
lie close to either S1 or S2. This bistability is a feature that we also saw in solutions of
the ordinary differential equation model.
The ex-showdown expectations of each player in the solutions shown in Figures 11
and 12 are shown in table 1. For k = 0.001, these are close to those for the equilibrium
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Figure 11: The solution for P = 9, k = 0.01 and 0.001 and L = 6, 12 and 24.
Figure 12: The solution for P = 9, k = 0.01 and 0.001 and L = 48, 96 and 192.
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Figure 13: The solution for P = 9, k = 0.001 and L = 6 and 192. The horizontal dashed
lines indicate the solution S2.
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Figure 14: The solution for P = 9, k = 0.01 and L = 6 and 192. The horizontal dashed
lines indicate the solution S2.
23
Figure 15: The solution for P = 9, k = 0.001 and L = 6 for two different initial
conditions. The horizontal dashed lines indicate the solution S2.
24
k = 0.001 k = 0.01
-0.132 -0.134
L = 6 -0.098 -0.101
0.230 0.235
-0.130 -0.132
L = 12 -0.103 -0.105
0.234 0.237
-0.129 -0.133
L = 24 -0.105 -0.107
0.234 0.241
-0.129 -0.138
L = 48 -0.105 -0.110
0.234 0.248
-0.129 -0.143
L = 96 -0.106 -0.112
0.235 0.255
-0.130 -0.139
L = 192 -0.107 -0.115
0.237 0.254
Table 1: Ex-showdown expectations when P = 9 for Player 1, 2 and 3, corresponding
to solutions shown in Figures 11 and 12. The corresponding values for Solution 2 are
-0.130, -0.104 and 0.233.
solution S2, given by (16), multiplied by a factor of two to account for the fact that only
12 of the 24 possible combinations of cards are dealt in the simulation. For k = 0.01,
Player 3 does a little better at the expense of Players 1 and 2.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied a reduced version of three player Kuhn poker - the one-
third street game. We found that we could find the complete set of possible equilibrium
solutions analytically, for all positive pot sizes P . For some values of the pot size (P = 5,
P > P ∗ = 12
(
5 +
√
73
) ≈ 6.77), there is an opportunity for one player to transfer
profit between the other two players at equilibrium. This leads to opportunities for the
formation of alliances in repeated play of the game. We also introduced simplified three
player, one-third street Kuhn poker (SKP), which has two interesting and useful features.
Firstly, there is only one strategic decision available for each player, characterized by a
single action frequency. Secondly, we showed that for P > P ∗, three distinct equilibrium
solutions exist, and for P > 7 there is no obvious way of deciding which solution, if any,
is likely to be realized in practice.
We then moved on to study two dynamic models of repeated play of SKP. In an
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ordinary differential equation model, we found that the large time solutions are oscilla-
tory, with either Player 1 or Player 2 (but not both) catching bluffs made by Player 3.
This model assumes that each player has perfect knowledge of the other players’ betting
frequencies. In a difference equation model, with each player estimating the other play-
ers’ betting frequencies based on the information available to them over the previous L
deals, we found a variety of possible behaviours, depending on the frequency adjustment
rate and memory parameters. For slow enough frequency adjustment, the solutions are
noisy, but otherwise similar to the differential equation model, but more rapid frequency
adjustment leads to large oscillations in all players’ betting frequencies.
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A Kuhn poker: Unique equilibrium solution for P ≥ 2
There are 4P3 = 24 different ways to deal three from four cards to three players. By
considering each of these and the probability and payoffs associated with each possible
sequence of actions shown in the game tree in Figure 1, we find that the ex-showdown
expectations for each player are given by
24E1 = cQ [−2 + bJ {P − (P + 2) oK}]+cK {−2 + P (bJ + bQ)}+(2− P + oK) (bJ + bQ) ,
(30)
24E2 = dQ {cK − 2 + bJ (1− cK) (P + 1)}+dK {cQ − 2 + bJ (1− cQ) (P + 1) + bQ (P + 1)}
+oK [−cQ − bQ + bJ {(P + 2) cQ − 1}]+ bJ (2− P + cQ + cK)+ bQ (2− P + cK) , (31)
24E3 = bJ [2P − 4− (P + 1) {cQ (1− dK) + dK + cK (1− dQ) + dQ}]
+bQ {2P − 4− (P + 1) (cK + dK)}+2 (cQ + cK)+(2−cK)dQ+(2−cQ)dK+cQoK . (32)
By noting that Player 3 chooses bJ and bQ to maximise E3, Player 1 chooses cQ and
cK to maximise E1 and Player 2 chooses dQ, dK and oK to maximise E2, we can find
the seven constraints that must be satisfied by equilibrium solutions, which correspond
to the seven strategy parameters. In each case there are three possibilities, either an
indifference holds (each equality labelled (c)) or the corresponding parameter is chosen
to be one or zero to maximise expectation (each inequality labelled (a) or (b)).
1. (a) cQ(1− dK) + dK + cK(1− dQ) + dQ < 2P−4P+1 & bJ = 1,
(b) cQ(1− dK) + dK + cK(1− dQ) + dQ > 2P−4P+1 & bJ = 0,
(c) cQ(1− dK) + dK + cK(1− dQ) + dQ = 2P−4P+1 & 0 ≤ bJ ≤ 1,
2. (a) cK + dK <
2P−4
P+1 & bQ = 1,
(b) cK + dK >
2P−4
P+1 & bQ = 0,
(c) cK + dK =
2P−4
P+1 & 0 ≤ bQ ≤ 1,
3. (a) −2 + bJ {P − (P + 2) oK} > 0 & cQ = 1,
(b) −2 + bJ {P − (P + 2) oK} < 0 & cQ = 0,
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(c) −2 + bJ {P − (P + 2) oK} = 0 & 0 ≤ cQ ≤ 1,
4. (a) bJ + bQ >
2
P & cK = 1,
(b) bJ + bQ <
2
P & cK = 0,
(c) bJ + bQ =
2
P & 0 ≤ cK ≤ 1,
5. (a) cK − 2 + bJ (1− cK) (P + 1) > 0 & dQ = 1,
(b) cK − 2 + bJ (1− cK) (P + 1) < 0 & dQ = 0,
(c) cK − 2 + bJ (1− cK) (P + 1) = 0 & 0 ≤ dQ ≤ 1,
6. (a) cQ − 2 + bJ (1− cQ) (P + 1) + bQ (P + 1) > 0 & dK = 1,
(b) cQ − 2 + bJ (1− cQ) (P + 1) + bQ (P + 1) < 0 & dK = 0,
(c) cQ − 2 + bJ (1− cQ) (P + 1) + bQ (P + 1) = 0 & 0 ≤ dK ≤ 1,
7. (a) −cQ − bQ − bJ + bJcQ (P + 2) > 0 & oK = 1,
(b) −cQ − bQ − bJ + bJcQ (P + 2) < 0 & oK = 0,
(c) −cQ − bQ − bJ + bJcQ (P + 2) = 0 & 0 ≤ oK ≤ 1.
For each value of P ≥ 2, our task is to find all sets of strategy parameters, (bJ , bQ, cQ, cK , dQ, dK , oK),
such that at least one of (a), (b) and (c) holds for each of these seven constraints. These
are the equilibrium solutions.
We can eliminate 1.(a), 1.(b), 2.(b) and 7.(a) immediately.
• 1.(a) =⇒ bJ = 1 =⇒ 4.(a) =⇒ cK = 1 =⇒ 5.(b) =⇒ dQ = 0. Then
1.(a) =⇒ cK + dK < 2P−4P+1 − cQ(1 − dK) ≤ 2P−4P+1 =⇒ 2.(a) =⇒ bQ = 1 =⇒
cK − 2 + bJ(1 − cQ)(P + 1) + bQ(P + 1) = P + (1 − cQ)(P + 1) > 0 =⇒ 6.(a)
=⇒ dK = 1 =⇒ cK + dK > 2P−4P+1 , a contradiction.
• 1.(b) =⇒ bJ = 0 =⇒
(
(3.(b) =⇒ cQ = 0) & (5.(b) =⇒ dQ = 0)
)
. Then
1.(b) =⇒ cK + dK > 2P−4P+1 =⇒ 2.(b) =⇒ bQ = 0 =⇒
(
(4.(b) =⇒ cK =
0) & (6.(b) =⇒ dK = 0)
)
=⇒ cQ(1 − dK) + dK + cK(1 − dQ) + dQ = 0, which
contradicts 1.(b).
• Since we now know that 1.(c) must hold, cK +dK − 2P−4P+1 = −cQ(1−dK)−dQ(1−
cK) ≤ 0 =⇒ 2.(b) cannot hold.
• 7.(a) =⇒ oK = 1 =⇒ 3.(b) =⇒ cQ = 0, which contradicts 7.(a).
The remaining constraints can now be written as
1. (c) cK + dK − 2P−4P+1 = −cQ(1− dK)− dQ(1− cK) & 0 ≤ bJ ≤ 1
2. (a) −cQ(1− dK)− dQ(1− cK) < 0 & bQ = 1,
(c) −cQ(1− dK)− dQ(1− cK) = 0 & 0 ≤ bQ ≤ 1,
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3. (a) −2 + bJ {P − (P + 2) oK} > 0 & cQ = 1,
(b) −2 + bJ {P − (P + 2) oK} < 0 & cQ = 0,
(c) −2 + bJ {P − (P + 2) oK} = 0 & 0 ≤ cQ ≤ 1,
4. (a) bJ + bQ >
2
P & cK = 1,
(b) bJ + bQ <
2
P & cK = 0,
(c) bJ + bQ =
2
P & 0 ≤ cK ≤ 1,
5. (a) cK − 2 + bJ (1− cK) (P + 1) > 0 & dQ = 1,
(b) cK − 2 + bJ (1− cK) (P + 1) < 0 & dQ = 0,
(c) cK − 2 + bJ (1− cK) (P + 1) = 0 & 0 ≤ dQ ≤ 1,
6. (a) cQ − 2 + bJ (1− cQ) (P + 1) + bQ (P + 1) > 0 & dK = 1,
(b) cQ − 2 + bJ (1− cQ) (P + 1) + bQ (P + 1) < 0 & dK = 0,
(c) cQ − 2 + bJ (1− cQ) (P + 1) + bQ (P + 1) = 0 & 0 ≤ dK ≤ 1,
7. (b) −cQ − bQ − bJ + bJcQ (P + 2) < 0 & oK = 0,
(c) −cQ − bQ − bJ + bJcQ (P + 2) = 0 & 0 ≤ oK ≤ 1.
We will subdivide the remaining analysis according to the value of cQ.
A.1 cQ = 0
By looking for equilibrium solutions with cQ = 0, after noting that this implies 7.(b),
and hence oK = 0, the constraints are greatly simplified to
1. (c) cK + dK − 2P−4P+1 = −dQ(1− cK), 0 ≤ bJ ≤ 1,
2. (a) −dQ(1− cK) < 0 & bQ = 1,
(c) −dQ(1− cK) = 0 & 0 ≤ bQ ≤ 1,
3. (b) bJ ≤ 2P ,
4. (a) bJ + bQ >
2
P & cK = 1,
(b) bJ + bQ <
2
P & cK = 0,
(c) bJ + bQ =
2
P & 0 ≤ cK ≤ 1,
5. (a) cK − 2 + bJ (1− cK) (P + 1) > 0 & dQ = 1,
(b) cK − 2 + bJ (1− cK) (P + 1) < 0 & dQ = 0,
(c) cK − 2 + bJ (1− cK) (P + 1) = 0 & 0 ≤ dQ ≤ 1,
6. (a) bJ + bQ >
2
P+1 & dK = 1,
(b) bJ + bQ <
2
P+1 & dK = 0,
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(c) bJ + bQ =
2
P+1 & 0 ≤ dK ≤ 1.
If 2.(a) is true then bQ = 1 =⇒ 4.(a) =⇒ cK = 1, which contradicts 2.(a). We
conclude that only 2.(c) can be true, and therefore that dQ = 0 or cK = 1. Now note
from 5.(b) that cK = 1 =⇒ dQ = 0, so the least restrictive conclusion is that dQ = 0,
and hence from 1.(c)
cK + dK =
2P − 4
P + 1
, 0 ≤ bJ ≤ 1. (33)
Now note that 4.(a) =⇒ 6.(a) =⇒ cK + dK = 2, which contradicts (33), so 4.(a)
cannot hold. Similarly 6.(b) =⇒ 4.(b) =⇒ cK + dK = 0, which also contradicts (33),
so 6.(b) cannot hold. Then, since 4.(c) and 6.(c) cannot hold simultaneously, we have
either
bJ + bQ =
2
P + 1
, 0 ≤ dK ≤ 1, cK = 0, (34)
or
bJ + bQ =
2
P
, 0 ≤ cK ≤ 1, dK = 1. (35)
From (33) we can see that (34) can hold if 2 ≤ P ≤ 5, whilst (35) can hold if P ≥ 5,
although in this case there is a constraint on the size of bQ that arises from 5.(b) (shown
in (4)). This is the equilibrium solution given by (1) to (6) with cQ = 0.
A.2 0 < cQ < 1
In this case, 3.(c) shows that
bJ =
2
P − (P + 2)oK ≥
2
P
, (36)
and hence 4.(b) cannot hold. It is now easiest to consider 2.(a) and 2.(c) separately.
A.2.1 bQ = 1
Now bQ = 1 =⇒ 2.(a) =⇒
(
(4.(a) =⇒ cK = 1) & (6.(a) =⇒ dk = 1)
)
. However,
cK = dK = 1 is inconsistent with 1.(c), so there is no equilibrium that satisfies 2.(a).
A.2.2 bQ < 1
Now bQ < 1 =⇒ 2.(c) =⇒ (dK = 1 and dQ = 0) =⇒ cK = P−5P+1 =⇒ (P >
5 & 4.(c)) =⇒ bJ + bQ = 2P . Now (36) =⇒ bJ = 2P , bQ = 0 and oK = 0. This means
that the inequalities in 5.(b), 6.(a) and 7.(b) must hold. On substituting these values of
the parameters into these inequalities, we find that we also need
P > P ∗ ≡ 1
2
(
5 +
√
73
)
≈ 6.77, cQ < 2
P + 4
. (37)
This is Solution B in (6).
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A.3 cQ = 1
If 2.(a) is true =⇒ bQ = 1 =⇒
(
(4.(a) =⇒ cK = 1) & (6.(a) =⇒ dK = 1)
)
, which
contradicts 2.(a), and hence 2.(c) must hold, i.e. −(1 − dK) − dQ(1 − cK) = 0. Since
5.(b) shows that cK = 1 =⇒ dQ = 0, the least restrictive assumption is that dQ = 0
and dK = 1, and hence cK =
P−5
P+1 and P ≥ 5.
If oK = 0, 3.(a) contradicts 4.(c), so 7.(c) must hold. Along with 4.(c), this gives
bJ = 1/P and bQ = 1/P , in contradiction with 3.(a). We conclude that no equilibrium
solution with cQ = 1 is possible.
B Simplified Kuhn poker: Two or three equilibrium solutions
The ex-showdown expectations for this game are given by
24E1 = cK(PbJ − 2)− (P − 2)bJ , (38)
24E2 = dQ {cK − 2 + bJ(1− cK)(P + 1)}+ bJ(cK + 3)− 2, (39)
24E3 = bJ [P − 5− (P + 1) {dQ + (1− dQ)cK}] + 2cK + (2− cK)dQ + 2, (40)
and the three constraints that must hold at equilibrium are
1. (a) dQ + (1− dQ)cK < P−5P+1 & bJ = 1,
(b) dQ + (1− dQ)cK > P−5P+1 & bJ = 0,
(c) dQ + (1− dQ)cK = P−5P+1 & 0 ≤ bJ ≤ 1,
2. (a) bJ >
2
P & cK = 1,
(b) bJ <
2
P & cK = 0,
(c) bJ =
2
P & 0 ≤ cK ≤ 1,
3. (a) (1− cK) {bJ(P + 1)− 1} − 1 > 0 & dQ = 1,
(b) (1− cK) {bJ(P + 1)− 1} − 1 < 0 & dQ = 0,
(c) (1− cK) {bJ(P + 1)− 1} − 1 = 0 & 0 ≤ dQ ≤ 1.
Firstly, we note that
• 1.(a) =⇒ bJ = 1 =⇒ 2.(a) =⇒ cK = 1 =⇒ 3.(b) =⇒ dQ = 0, in
contradiction with 1.(a),
• 1.(b) =⇒ bJ = 0 =⇒ 2.(b) =⇒ cK = 0 =⇒ 3.(b) =⇒ dQ = 0, in
contradiction with 1.(b).
We conclude that only 1.(c) can hold, and hence that equilibrium solutions have
dQ + (1− dQ)cK = P − 5
P + 1
. (41)
This immediately shows that cK 6= 1 and dQ 6= 1, eliminating the possibility of either
2.(a) or 3.(a) at equilibrium. This leaves just 2.(b), (c) and 3.(b), (c). Although 2.(b)
and 3.(b) cannot hold simultaneously, the other three combinations are all possible, and
lead to the equilibrium solutions (12) to (14).
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C Solution using symbolic algebra
For the relatively small games that we have studied in this paper, the analytical solution
can also be determined using symbolic algebra.
C.1 Simplifed Kuhn Poker
We used Mathematica to confirm the analysis of section B. Noting that && and || are
the logical AND and OR operators, the command
FullSimplify[
Solve[((d + (1 - d) c < (P - 5)/(P + 1) && b == 1) ||
(d + (1 - d) c > (P - 5)/(P + 1) && b == 0) || (d + (1 - d) c == (P - 5)/(P + 1)))
&&
((b > 2/P && c == 1) || (b < 2/P && c == 0) || (b == 2/P))
&&
(((1 - c) (b (P + 1) - 1) - 1 > 0 && d == 1) ||
((1 - c) (b (P + 1) - 1) - 1 < 0 && d == 0) || ((1 - c) (b (P + 1) - 1) - 1 == 0))
&&
(d >= 0) && (d <= 1) && (c >= 0) && (c <= 1) && (b >= 0) && (b <= 1)
&&
(P>5) , {b, c, d}]]
asks Mathematica to find solutions of the problem defined in section B. The resulting
solution is
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which reproduces the solutions (12) to (14) for P 6= P ∗. In order to find the solution for
P = P ∗, which Mathematica is unable to locate in this general setting, the value of P
must be specified and the command run again.
C.2 Kuhn poker
Using this method directly for the problem defined in section A outruns the 16Gb of
RAM available to us. This suggested that we should set up the problem in separate
pieces, using
S1[1] = cQ (1 - dK) + dK + cK (1 - dQ) + dQ < (2 P - 4)/(P + 1) && bJ == 1;
S1[2] = cQ (1 - dK) + dK + cK (1 - dQ) + dQ > (2 P - 4)/(P + 1) && bJ == 0;
S1[3] = cQ (1 - dK) + dK + cK (1 - dQ) + dQ == (2 P - 4)/(P + 1);
S2[1] = cK + dK < (2 P - 4)/(P + 1) && bQ == 1;
S2[2] = cK + dK > (2 P - 4)/(P + 1) && bQ == 0;
S2[3] = cK + dK == (2 P - 4)/(P + 1);
S3[1] = -2 + bJ (P - (P + 2) oK) > 0 && cQ == 1;
S3[2] = -2 + bJ (P - (P + 2) oK) < 0 && cQ == 0;
S3[3] = -2 + bJ (P - (P + 2) oK) == 0;
S4[1] = bJ + bQ > 2/P && cK == 1;
S4[2] = bJ + bQ < 2/P && cK == 0;
S4[3] = bJ + bQ == 2/P;
S5[1] = cK - 2 + bJ (1 - cK) (P + 1) > 0 && dQ == 1;
S5[2] = cK - 2 + bJ (1 - cK) (P + 1) < 0 && dQ == 0;
S5[3] = cK - 2 + bJ (1 - cK) (P + 1) == 0;
S6[1] = cQ - 2 + bJ (1 - cQ) (P + 1) + bQ (P + 1) > 0 && dK == 1;
S6[2] = cQ - 2 + bJ (1 - cQ) (P + 1) + bQ (P + 1) < 0 && dK == 0;
S6[3] = cQ - 2 + bJ (1 - cQ) (P + 1) + bQ (P + 1) == 0;
S7[1] = -cQ - bQ - bJ + bJ cQ (P + 2) > 0 && oK == 1;
S7[2] = -cQ - bQ - bJ + bJ cQ (P + 2) < 0 && oK == 0;
S7[3] = -cQ - bQ - bJ + bJ cQ (P + 2) == 0;
We then ask Mathematica to look for a solution for each of the 37 = 2187 possible
combinations of constraints and output every valid solution using
Do[
sol = FullSimplify[
Solve[S1[i] && S2[j] && S3[k] && S4[l] && S5[m] && S6[n] && S7[o] &&
(dK >= 0) && (dK <= 1) && (cK >= 0) && (cK <= 1) && (bJ >=
0) && (bJ <= 1) && (dQ >= 0) && (dQ <= 1) && (cQ >=
0) && (cQ <= 1) && (bQ >= 0) && (bQ <= 1) && (oK >=
0) && (oK <= 1) && (P > 0), {bJ, bQ, cK, cQ, dK, dQ, oK}]];
If[Length[sol] > 0, {Print[i, j, k, l, m, n, o, sol]}]
, {i, 1, 3}, {j, 1, 3}, {k, 1, 3}, {l, 1, 3}, {m, 1, 3}, {n, 1, 3}, {o, 1, 3}
]
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The resulting output is
34
35
This reproduces the solutions (1) to (6). Note that, as we found in the previous section,
the solutions at the bifurcation points P = 5 and P = P ∗ do not appear in this solution
and need to be computed separately.
D Unbiassed estimators of opponents’ betting frequencies
In order to describe the estimators used in our simulation, we need to define some
notation. Of the twelve possible deals used in the simulation (recall that if Player
3 holds K or Q they check, so no decisions are made and we avoid simulating these
deals for reasons of computational efficient) the two cases AJK and AQK (Player 3’s
card listed first, then those of Players 1 and 2) also do not require any decisions (the
play goes bet/fold/call), and hence provide no information to any player, but must be
included in the simulation to obtain the correct frequencies. Using the same ordering of
cards, we refer to the remaining ten meaningful deals as
D1 = AJQ, D2 = AQJ, D3 = AKQ, D4 = AKJ, D5 = JAK,
D6 = JAQ, D7 = JKA, D8 = JQA, D9 = JKQ, D10 = JQK. (42)
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We also define the five possible betting sequences as
B1 = k, B2 = bff, B3 = bcf, B4 = bfc, B5 = bcc, (43)
with check, bet, call and fold represented by ’k’, ’b’, ’c’ and ’f’. For each combination
of deal and betting sequence, Table 2 shows the probability of its occurence (public
information) and the cards that are known to all players. For example, consider the
combination D3 = AKQ and B4 = bfc. Player 3 always bets holding A, Player 1 folds K
with probability 1− cK and Player 2 calls with Q with probability dQ, giving an overall
probability (1− cK)dQ. The publicly known cards are given as AXQ because Players 2
and 3 do not know whether Player 1 folded J or K. The same reasoning gives the entries
in the rest of Table 2.
We now define Npij to be the number of occurences of betting sequence i and deal j
seen by player p in the last Lp hands (recall that Player p only remembers the last Lp
deals). In some cases, a player cannot distinguish between some of these numbers. For
example, neither Player 2 nor Player 3 can distinguish between (B4, D1) and (B4, D3),
because they have no way of knowing whether Player 1 held J or K. This means that
Players 2 and 3 can only count Np41 + N
p
43. This is taken into account in the analysis
below where necessary (for example, Np41 + N
p
43 appears in (45) and (47) below).
Players 1 and 2 both estimate Player 3’s bluffing frequency using
b¯p =
Np3,5 + N
p
3,6 + N
p
4,7 + N
p
5,7 + N
p
4,8 + N
p
4,10
Np3,5 + N
p
3,6 + N
p
4,7 + N
p
5,7 + N
p
4,8 + N
p
4,10 +
5
6
(
Np1,5 + N
p
1,6 + N
p
1,7 + N
p
1,8 + N
p
1,9 + N
p
1,10
) .
(44)
Only Player 3 needs to estimate the frequency with which Player 2 calls with a Q (see
(28)), and we use
d¯ =
2
(
N34,1 + N
3
4,3
)
+ N34,9
N34,1 + N
3
4,3 + N
3
2,1 + N
3
2,2 + N
3
2,3 + N
3
2,4 + N
3
2,9 + N
3
4,9
. (45)
Both Player 2 and Player 3 need to estimate the frequency with which Player 1 calls
with a K. The asymmetry of the information available to them means that they must
use different estimators, and we have taken
c¯2 =
2
(
N23,3 + N
2
3,4 + N
2
3,9 + N
2
5,7
)
N23,3 + N
2
3,4 + N
2
3,9 + N
2
5,7 + 2
(
N22,2 + N
2
2,4
)
+ N24,7 + N
2
4,8
, (46)
c¯3 =
2
(
N33,3 + N
3
3,4
)
+ 32
(
N33,9 + N
3
5,7
)
N33,3 + N
3
3,4 + N
3
3,9 + N
3
5,7 + N
3
2,1 + N
3
2,2 + N
3
2,3 + N
3
2,4 + N
3
4,1 + N
3
4,3 + N
3
2,9 + N
3
4,7 + N
3
4,8 + N
3
4,9
.
(47)
These are not the only possible estimators, but they are reasonable choices for our
simulation. We will derive (45) here. The other estimators follow in a similar manner.
From the information in Table 2, we can see that
N34,1 + N
3
4,3 ∝ (2− cK) dQ,
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N32,1 + N
3
2,2 + N
3
2,3 + N
3
2,4 ∝ (2− cK) (2− dQ) ,
N32,9 ∝ bJ (1− cK) (1− dQ) ,
N34,9 ∝ bJ (1− cK) dQ.
Hence, as L3 →∞
N34,1 + N
3
4,3
N32,1 + N
3
2,2 + N
3
2,3 + N
3
2,4
→ dQ
2− dQ ,
N34,9
N32,9
→ dQ
1− dQ ,
and therefore both
2
(
N34,1 + N
3
4,3
)
N34,1 + N
3
4,3 + N
3
2,1 + N
3
2,2 + N
3
2,3 + N
3
2,4
and
N34,9
N32,9 + N
3
4,9
are unbiassed estimators of dQ, so we can combine them to give (45).
In order to confirm that these estimators are unbiassed and to determine how noisy
they are as L, the number of hands used for the estimate, varies, we simulated 1.1× 107
rounds of play with frequencies fixed at Solution 3, given by (14), with P = 9. We then
took the mean and standard deviation of the final 107 values of the estimates. Figure 16
shows that the estimators converge to the correct frequencies as L → ∞, and indeed
that, in the mean, they provide a reasonable estimate of each frequency even when L is
as low as six, the smallest value shown. Figure 17 shows that the standard deviation of
each estimator scales with L−1/2 as L → ∞, as we would expect. We can also see that
each estimate is very noisy, with standard deviations of all estimates less than 0.1 only
for L > 120, Player 3’s estimate of d is the noisiest estimate and the estimate of b the
least noisy. This illustrates how hard it is to accurately estimate frequencies without
introducing a lag into the estimate. The larger the value of L, the more accurate the
estimates, at least for constant opponent frequencies, but, for time-varying frequencies,
the more out of date the estimate becomes.
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Figure 16: The mean value of the estimators for P = 9
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Figure 17: The standard deviation of the estimators for P = 9
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